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PRIVATE POWER, THE PRESS, AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 
C Edwin Baker* 
Unlike constitutions that have no state action restriction, our 
constitution guarantees most individual rights only against violation 
by government. A common view is that whatever policy issues are 
presented by potential abuse of private power, 1 private power has 
little to do with American constitutional law. Then, on second 
thought, commentators typically admit that given the protean na-
ture of our notion of state action, sometimes the interpretation of 
this concept makes private power constitutionally relevant. This 
limited view of the relevance of private power for constitutional in-
terpretation is, I will argue, wrong. 
Certainly, private power can be a major threat to freedom, 
equality and other fundamental individual liberties. Constitutional 
commentators vary in the extent to which they recognize this fact. 
Of course, the extent of an interpreter's concern about private 
power affects her willingness to find state action. My general thesis, 
however, is that an interpreter's concern or lack of concern about 
private power will also significantly affect her substantive interpre-
tation of constitutional provisions. Moreover, since I think this is 
as it should be, my claim implies that an informed understanding of 
private power-presumably gained through normatively guided his-
torical, sociological and economic studies-is crucial for getting 
constitutional law "right." I will illustrate my thesis primarily by 
examining how concerns about private power could and should af-
fect interpretation of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom 
of the press. 2 
• © 1993 by C. Edwin Baker. Nicholas Gallichio Professor of Law, University of 
Pennsylvania. 
I. "Power" here refers to the capacity of the power· holder to control others or to get 
them to act other than they would have chosen if not for the exercise of power. Elsewhere, 
following Hannah Arendt, I have discussed a much less instrumentalist conception of 
power-people's capacity to get together to do things. See C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty 
and Freedom of Speech 99 (Oxford U. Press, 1989). 
2. The discussion of the press, especially in Parts II and V, below, are based on C. 
Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press (Princeton Press, forthcoming 1993), revis· 
ing and expanding an article of the same title published in 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2097 (1992). 
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I. PRIVATE POWER AND THE CONSTITUTION 
The constitutionalist's initial, unreflective response to threaten-
ing aspects of private power is to note that, with a few exceptions, 
our constitution applies only to the actions or inactions of govern-
ment. On this view, problematic private power raises only ques-
tions concerning the scope of-that is, the actors or activities 
covered by-but not the substance of, constitutional provisions.3 
Ominous private power could induce the constitutionalist to find 
"state action" and, on that basis, to apply recognized constitutional 
norms to some realm of otherwise presumptively private behavior. 
This picture is misleading from the start. Students commonly 
begin thinking that the "state action issue" is an objective, eviden-
tiary matter of looking for tell-tale signs of the state, of looking for a 
border between a public or government realm and a private realm. 
Most serious commentators, however, soon realize that this search 
is a largely unhelpful diversion. State action is a sea in which every-
thing else floats.4 For this reason, constitutional theorists often con-
clude that the question is seldom whether there is state action but 
whether the obvious state action (including obvious state inaction) 
is acceptable. That is, the real question is always a matter of a sub-
stantive interpretation of constitutional norms. Still, the notion of 
state action does embody and highlight a real normative concern. 
The importance of preserving realms of private autonomy or areas 
of diminished collective responsibility properly motivates substan-
tive interpretation. 
State action disputes present, however, only a small subset of 
the interpretive contexts influenced by concerns about private 
power. The societal need to rein in private power can motivate con-
stitutional analysis in two quite different directions-toward ex-
panding the application of constitutional norms (by finding state 
action) in order to civilize private power or toward restricting or 
3. In typical realist fashion, David Strauss in this symposium pushes this view 
(although farther than I think wise) by suggesting not only that the concern with the threat-
ening aspects of private power stimulated an enlarged conception of state action during the 
period of the civil rights struggle, but today, the comparative lack of fear of governmental 
power (at least, that of local governments) and benefits of government experimentation (com-
pare Harlan and Frankfurter's views expressed in the incorporation debate) should lead to a 
narrowing of the concept of state action to exclude at least some activities of local govern-
ments. David A. Strauss, State Action After The Civil Rights Era, 10 Const. Comm. 413 
(1993). 
4. In different ways, both Larry Alexander's and Michael Seidman's contributions to 
this symposium make this point. Larry Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Con-
stitutional Limits on Private Power, IO Const. Comm. 363 (1993); Louis Michael Seidman, 
The State Action Paradox, 10 Const. Comm. 381 (1993). 
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sculpting constitutional protections of private power in order to 
leave that power subject to legislative control. 
The second interpretative move is pervasive in area after area 
of constitutional law. The most obvious examples may be in rela-
tion to property. Here, constitutional law eventually followed pop-
ular politics and social theory-although even today some 
conservative scholars and Republican appointees would have us go 
back to the Lochner days, treating programs adopted by virtually all 
other western democracies as not merely unwise but unconstitu-
tional. Constitutional commentary and judicial opinion eventually 
recognized that much property, especially exchange-valued or com-
mercial property, involves the instrumental use of private power in 
ways that often contradict social values or group welfare. This rec-
ognition helped motivate restrictive interpretations of constitutional 
guarantees related to property-including interpretations of the 
Due Process Clause, the Takings Clause, the Contracts Clause and 
the economic applications of equal protection. In contrast, prop-
erty's historic role in protecting a private realm of autonomy and 
security-against intrusion by either public or, sometimes, private 
power-continues to motivate expansive constitutional interpreta-
tions. For example, these traditional property-related values en-
courage recognition of guarantees of basic welfare minimums; 
likewise, they require a doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to 
police the relation of government and private individuals. Argua-
bly, some constitutional protections of newer forms of property may 
be significant in preserving the fundamental values ideologically as-
sociated with traditional private property, while protecting the 
traditional property, when used in the market as a form of private 
power over others, could today undermine those values.s In a 
sense, as contexts change-and here, the context is a heightened 
appreciation of the problem of private power-the appropriate in-
stitutional embodiments of a liberal commitment may be almost in-
verted (bringing to mind how John Stuart Mill eventually saw that 
his liberalism might require elements of socialism).6 
Rather than ranging through the constitution, however, I can 
adequately serve my present purposes by staying within the confines 
5. C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 132 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 741 (1986). 
6. Mill's pronounced egalitarian inclinations clearly affected his views about the need 
to reform the system of private property and introduce elements of what have come to be seen 
as the welfare state. The significance of his claim in his Autobiography that "our ideal of 
ultimate improvement ... would class us under the general description of Socialists," is 
discussed in Lionel Robbins, The Theory of Economic Policy in English Classical Political 
Economy 151-68 (Macmillan, 2d ed. 1978). 
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of the First Amendment. My focus here is on the Press Clause. 
But, in addition, concern with private power is at the root of vari-
ous disputes about the proper interpretation of free exercise of reli-
gion, freedom of association and even freedom of speech. I will first 
describe how private power threatens press freedom. Then I will 
contrast this threat to problems posed by private power in relation 
to other First Amendment rights. With that background, I will 
suggest how the concern with private power could and should moti-
vate the interpretation of the Press Clause. 
II. PRIVATE POWER AND THE PRESS 
Like most constitutional commentators, both here and abroad, 
I assume that the freedom of the press refers not merely to written 
speech but rather protects an institution, a set of commercial and 
non-commercial enterprises engaged in the activity of communicat-
ing "to" and sometimes "with" a broader public. The Press Clause 
in the Constitution grants these enterprises a variety of protections 
against government limitation. Nevertheless, at least in liberal the-
ory, institutions, unlike people, will at bottom have only instrumen-
tal, not intrinsic, value. The value of institutions must lie in how 
they serve human interests. I will assume that the justification of 
constitutional protection of the press relates to the special contribu-
tion that a free press makes to democracy broadly conceived. Or, 
more specifically, the Constitution should help protect the press's 
role in checking government abuse, in providing a forum for a com-
mon public cultural and political debate and forums in which sub-
groups develop their own identities, in being a crucial instrument of 
political and social mobilization and in providing broadly for peo-
ple's need or desire for non-governmentally controlled facts, vision 
and direction. 
Governmentally unimpeded private power-power to chal-
lenge and expose government-might be precisely what freedom of 
the press implies. The Constitution guarantees protection of the 
press as a power center outside governmental control in order to be 
a counterweight to government. Thus, press freedom might mean, 
and mean only, freedom from governmental regulation or distorting 
influence-but that interpretation is neither the wisest nor most 
common. As an institution, the press is an amalgamation of many 
private centers of power. The legal regime can affect the relative 
role and strength of these different and sometimes conflicting forces. 
It is my thesis that, depending on the context, some of these forces, 
especially the power of owners and of private advertisers, often 
inappropriately fetter press performance and in that way undermine 
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press freedom. Under this view, press freedom can be undermined 
either by government or by private power. I claim this point is not 
only analytically true, but popularly recognized. 
In this country, I suspect that most people (possibly not in-
cluding most constitutional lawyers) believe that a violation of free-
dom of the press occurs if a conglomerate owner, say a company 
that produces nuclear reactors, causes its television network to pro-
mote positive stories but not to cover negative stories about nuclear 
energy, 1 or if an owner refuses to publish an expose about misdeeds 
of a major advertiser-and an even greater violation of press free-
dom occurs if the owner fires the reporter.s More generally, a plau-
sible conception of press freedom is violated by any use of power, 
whether public or private, to suppress or slant stories for non-jour-
nalistic reasons or for reasons contrary to the public's interest in or 
need for the story. This view of press freedom identifies the pro-
tected institution primarily with the editors and journalists involved 
in the enterprise and their professional judgement, not with the 
owners. In this vision, the answer to Jerome Barron's compelling 
question, "freedom of the press for whom?"9 is, in the broadest 
sense, that the guarantee of freedom is to benefit the public. Opera-
tionally, however, this view assumes that the public is best served by 
journalistic entities free from censorial constraint by either govern-
ment or private power.w 
Recognition that private power can limit press freedom con-
fronts no initial conceptual roadblocks in countries such as Ger-
many, whose constitutional guarantee of press freedom contains no 
state action limitation. German law recognizes that constitution-
ally-based press freedom can be abridged by owners or by private 
economic decisions whereby commercial television siphons off ad-
vertising revenue needed to support newspapers. Some German 
legislative proposals to protect against private power have gone 
7. Martin A. Lee and Norman Solomon, Unreliable Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias 
in News Media 77-80 (Carol Pub. Group, 1990). 
8. For apparent examples of firings, see John R. Logan and Harvey L. Molotch, Ur-
ban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place 73 (U. of Cal. Press, 1987); Ben H. Bagdikian, 
The Media Monopoly 37 (Beacon Press, 4th ed. 1992). Bagdikian reports that "a survey by 
the American Society of Newspaper Editors found that 33 percent of all editors working for 
newspaper chains said they would not feel free to run a news story that was damaging to their 
parent finn." ld. at 30. 
9. Jerome A. Barron, Freedom of the Press for Whom? (Indiana U. Press, 1975); Je-
rome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 
(1967). 
10. Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech at 250-271 (cited in note 1). Cf. 
Clyde Haberman, Israeli Court Limits Publisher's Power Over Staff, N.Y. Times, May 16, 
1993, at 12 (editors and reporters praised decision as upholding their freedom of expression). 
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even farther. As I understand it,n the German Social Democrats 
acceded to the exemption of newspapers from the codetermination 
labor laws because codetermination would limit a newspaper's jour-
nalistic freedom by giving (non-journalistic) "labor," specifically, 
the newspaper's mechanical, clerical, and distributional workers, a 
say in the newspaper's journalistic operations. But the Social Dem-
ocrats argued that the same logic required that the press be granted 
substantial freedom from capital, from ownership. Even though the 
Social Democrats' legislative position did not prevail, the idea that 
the press freedom belongs largely to the journalistic enterprise, not 
to ownership, made perfect sense and is widely accepted in Ger-
many and elsewhere. 
Thus, common conceptions of press freedom recognize that it 
can be abridged by private power. My empirical thesis is that pri-
vate power causes the press to be too timid in exposing corruption 
and abuse both of public and especially of private power, insuffi-
ciently diverse in its presentations, relatively unresponsive to signifi-
cant elements of society and more encouraging of political passivity 
than public involvement. This factual thesis requires careful sub-
stantiation, but if correct, the question then arises whether legal re-
sponses could change the situation for the better. If, as I think, the 
answer to this policy question is also "yes," the problem of private 
power intersects with constitutional law. The question posed is 
whether legal intervention to promote press freedom would be, as 
many in the media industry routinely assert, an unconstitutional 
abridgment of press freedom. 
But before moving to the constitutional question, what about 
the empirical thesis? Private power, especially that of advertisers 
and owners, might not restrict the press's freedom or its inclination 
to serve democratic society. The explanation of the benignity of 
private power most likely to be advanced within the academic legal 
community is that this country's incredible number of media out-
lets, on the whole, respond to market demand, and that this respon-
siveness roughly corresponds to the constitutionally-valued 
performance.•2 In other words, the standard argument is that un-
regulated markets generally cause enterprises, including the press, 
to produce what people value. And the attempt to produce any-
II. This account is based on conversations in 1991 with Professor Fritz Kubler, who 
was involved in the events described. 
12. An alternative argument that I also think is wrong, at least when stated strongly, is 
that various aspects of professional craft, professionalism and technical demands of produc-
ing news operate as determinants of media performance to an extent that makes the influence 
of ownership and advertising largely irrelevant. I plan in later work to consider this claim it 
in greater depth. 
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thing other than what people value is authoritarian and/or pater-
nalistic. This defense asserts that critiques of market-oriented 
performance tend to be elitist and subjective as well as paternalis-
tic-and should be rejected as a basis for any government interven-
tion directed at the press. Rather, free press means a free market. 
This standard economic argument is riddled with errors. Most 
generally, mere responsiveness to market expressions of consumer 
desire should be rejected as an adequate standard of media perform-
ance. For example, second order (often politically rather than mar-
ket expressed) preferences exist for arenas of public debate and for 
institutions promoting education and enlightenment to an extent 
not indicated by "private" market-expressed desires. Moreover, the 
underlying justifications for "often" treating preferences as appro-
priate guides to policy is that the preferences reflect the outcome of 
people's experience and their discussions within an ethically-defen-
sible environment, an environment that would include opportunities 
for informed and reflective development of desires or preferences. 
In other words, the existence of an adequate free and democratic 
media should be seen as prior to--as a prerequisite for-rather than 
the outcome of justifiable reliance on market expressions of 
preferences. 
But even if the economic market model generally provides a 
proper standard of performance, a host of special empirical charac-
teristics of the media marketplace cause serious market failures. 
Some of these failures go to the heart of a free press's service to 
democracy. Out of a much larger list, four features of the media 
market will illustrate these failures. 
First, the market predictably produces a much more perverse 
distribution in the media setting than in most contexts; media and 
cultural products are foundational for choice and democratic par-
ticipation. Thus, arguably these goods ought to be distributed more 
like the vote or like education, that is, on a basis of relative equality 
of access, rather than on the market basis of willingness and ability 
to pay. Although I find that egalitarian claim quite persuasive, I 
will put it aside here. Still, surely the poor should not be charged a 
higher proportion of the cost of those media products that they de-
sire than the wealthy are charged for their favored products.IJ But 
this inequality, this subsidy for the wealthy, is built into much of 
the existing media marketplace. 
13. Implicit in the following textual argument is the assumption, for which there is 
considerable empirical support, that not only do ''tastes" for media products vary, but the 
variation partially correlates with income and personal wealth (and with racial or ethnic 
status). 
428 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:421 
Advertisers pay the major portion of the cost of news and opin-
ion products-and, as market theory predicts, those who pay signif-
icantly determine the product produced. Readers often do not even 
pay the entire cost of a newspaper's paper and ink. Newspapers' 
efforts to cover costs, much less gain profits, typically depend on 
selling readers to advertisers. These advertisers differentially value 
media consumers. Specifically, advertisers pay more, that is, pro-
vide a much greater per person "subsidy," for media products deliv-
ered to, and hence designed for, the comparatively affluent than for 
those delivered to the poor. The different value of different readers 
to the advertiser is probably most explicit in Los Angeles Times pub-
lisher Otis Chandler's comment that giving more attention to mi-
nority issues "would not make sense financially ... (because] that 
audience does not have the purchasing power and is not responsive 
to the kind of advertising we carry."I4 The "danger" is that, if the 
paper reports news relevant to the minority community, people in 
that community might buy the paper. A New York Times market-
ing executive expressed the same point, I think, when he said that 
the New York Times "make[s] no effort to sell to the mob."1s Gan-
nett, one of the larger and most profitable chains, apparently 
adopted a policy of raising cover prices as a means of shedding its 
least valuable readers as well as increasing circulation revenues.I6 
In both television and newspapers, advertising subsidizes me-
dia products designed for the comparatively affluent, thereby in-
creasing the inequality already embedded in society's unequal 
distribution of wealth. The competitive dominance of this "combi-
nation product" -media products sold to the public and audiences 
sold to advertisers-increases the media's tilt toward the compara-
tively affluent. Although the social and political consequences of 
this media tilt are uncertain, some rough predictions are possible. 
Subsidized production of content designed for the relatively affluent 
should result in their being, as compared to the relatively poor, bet-
ter informed and more likely to participate in the political process. 
A second problem with reliance on the market relates to the 
overall structure of the media industry and its products. I will illus-
trate this problem in relation to newspapers, probably the politically 
14. Stephen Bates, If No News, Send Rumors 198-99 (St. Martin's Press, 1989). Else-
where Chandler said that the LA. Times had "arbitrarily cut back some of [its]low-income 
circulation," because "American newspaper publishing is based on an advertising base, not a 
circulation base." Bagdikian, The Media Monopoly at 116 (cited in note 8). 
15. William B. Blankenburg, Newspaper Ownership and Control of Circulation to In-
crease Profits, 59 Journalism Q. 390, 392 (Donald Nizen quoted in Editor & Publisher, Jan. 3, 
1981, at 15). 
16. ld. at 393-94. 
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most important news medium. 11 A significant portion of the costs 
of producing a daily edition of a newspaper-all the costs of jour-
nalists, editors, wire services, etc.-are required to produce the first 
copy. Mostly for this reason, the more copies sold within a given 
geographical area, the less the average cost per copy. This type of 
declining cost is the trait that often causes a business to be a natural 
monopoly. However, people's differing interests in news, opinion 
and vision create demand for competing products-for example, 
differently edited newspapers. This demand for competing, differ-
entiated products predictably results in actual or potential monopo-
listic competition. The existence of competing daily newspapers in 
most large towns and cities at the turn of century illustrates such 
monopolistic competition-but over the course of the twentieth 
century, this competition steadily declined. Now only a handful of 
cities have two separately owned and operated competing daily 
newspapers. 
Monopolistic competition has an interesting, policy-relevant 
characteristic. Assuming a firm's inability to price discriminate ef-
fectively, the introduction of a "new" monopolistically competitive 
product could draw off enough of the demand for previously viable 
products that they are no longer economically viable even though 
their existence would still produce more value, measured by peo-
ple's willingness to pay, than they cost.ts Moreover, if the products 
made unprofitable by this monopolistic competition have compara-
tively steeply sloping demand curves, that is, are quite highly valued 
but only by a relatively small group, while the newly introduced 
prevailing product has a comparatively fiat demand curve, the new 
product's introduction quite likely results in a decline in consumer 
surplus, that is, a decline in the "value" (as measured by willingness 
to pay) produced. Or, in slightly less economic and more politically 
relevant terms, the competitive success of some media products may 
reduce the total diversity of media products even if media consum-
ers value the diverse media more than they do the prevailing prod-
uct. Elsewhere, I have argued that this outcome probably occurred 
and occurred largely due to the influence of advertising in the media 
marketplace.19 That is, market processes are likely to have pro-
17. John P. Robinson and Mark R. Levy, The Main Source: Learning from Television 
News (Sage Publications, 1986). 
18. That is, the introduction of the new product would cause the demand function for 
the old products to shift downward such that the demand curve would at all points lie below 
the average cost curve even though, at specific selling prices, the area under the demand 
function (the value produced) would be greater than the cost of providing the product at that 
price. 
19. Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press (cited in note 2). This role of advertising 
reflects several dynamics, including the reduced incentive to respond to readers' preferences 
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duced, in economic terms, market failures or, in social-political 
terms, a homogenization of news and vision. 
The third problem is the assumption that the market causes the 
media to be responsive to the public-or, more specifically, the buy-
ing portion of the public. Empirical economic studies, industry self-
perceptions and academic commentary on the media industry, espe-
cially the newspaper industry, all conclude that this assumption is 
significantly false. Competitive pressures apparently do not effec-
tively restrict newspapers' considerable discretion as to the quality 
and orientation of their contenvo Many serious observers believe 
that some media firms, but not others, use this discretion to serve 
the firms' ideas of the public interest rather than to extract all possi-
ble profit from the enterprise. In any event, this widely recognized 
discretion makes the characteristics of ownership and control cru-
cially important in determining how well the media serves a diverse 
society. Specifically, existing concentration and relative lack of di-
versity in ownership suggests a likely failure on the part of the me-
dia to serve the democratic functions that justify constitutional 
protection. 
Fourth, markets produce the claimed beneficial results only to 
the extent that the purchaser can accurately evaluate the product 
she receives. If the reader wishes to purchase the journalists' best 
professional judgment about identification and presentation of the 
relevant news of the day, but if information about whether the news 
has instead been sculpted to fit the hidden economic or ideological 
desires of advertisers or owners is not "cheaply" available to her, 
the market will be vulnerable to abuse. (In other areas, the legal 
response to this difficulty is embodied in the law of fraud or, in the 
case of some professions, in fiduciary or trust obligations.) Market 
failures are predictable to the extent media enterprises have eco-
nomic or other incentives not to provide the desired product. If 
advertisers or owners value "distortions" enough, the media will be 
most profitable if it "sells out." And the best (economic) result for 
the media is if, at the same time it bows to these private interests, it 
keeps this fact secret so that it can also sell "integrity and profes-
for a diverse product as the proportion of the media's revenue that comes from satisfying that 
preference declines as the proportion coming from advertising increases. 
20. This discretion predictably results from various features of the daily newspaper in-
dustry, including its typically local monopoly status that allows for operating profit margins 
as a percentage of revenue, which routinely exceed 20% and often go far beyond 30%, to be 
much greater than for most industries. Jonathan Kwitny, The High Cost of High Profits, 
Washington Journalism Rev., June 1990, at 19. Still, a few informed observers argue that 
newspapers' competition with other media, especially their competition for advertising dol-
lars, precludes or severely limits this discretion. See, e.g., James N. Rosse, Economic Limits 
of Press Responsibility (Studies in Industry Economics #56, Stanford University, 1975). 
1993] STATE ACTION SYMPOSIUM: BAKER 431 
sionalism" to the public. This provides an economic explanation 
for the media's constant public proclamations of their journalistic 
independence and integrity-their claim to maintain a wall of sepa-
ration between the journalistic and business side of their operations. 
The lack of cheaply assessable public information on this issue, 
however, provides the basis for abuse--or, in economic terms, for a 
market failure.21 
These four problems merely begin to illustrate the way the 
market is unlikely to produce a democratically responsive media. 
The influence of advertisers can cause or, more often, exacerbate 
these problems. Likewise, the discretion left to owners makes their 
identity-increasingly huge media conglomerates-and their corre-
sponding interests crucial to the likelihood that the media will per-
form its democratically-valued role. This concern with ownership 
discretion is intensified because the structure of the media market 
routinely places the interest in profits in tension with journalistic 
professionalism and democratic service. A fuller investigation 
would only show more ways in which the existing distribution and 
prerogatives of private power predictably cause the media to be less 
diverse, less critical of the status quo and less likely to be a mobiliz-
ing agent for needed or desired change than democratic theory 
requires. 
III. THE CONSTITUTION AGAIN-ASSOCIATION AND 
RELIGION 
The concern with abuses of private power generates interpreta-
tive issues in respect to many constitutional provisions, including 
other parts of the First Amendment. The common liberal emphasis 
on rationalism and individualism, along with its fear of concerted 
action, inclines interpretation of freedom of assembly and of associ-
ation toward encompassing only assemblies and associations that 
operate in aid of speech, in aid of communicating ideas in a public 
arena22 (or intimate associations as an aspect of a substantive due 
process privacy right23). 
This interpretation of freedom of assembly and association is 
2 I. Of course, considerable information on this issue is available and assimilated by the 
public-for example, the credibility of some media organizations is quite obviously not great. 
22. The comments on assembly and association are based on observations in Baker, 
Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech at 86, 132·34, 223·24, 316·17 n.18 (cited in note 1). 
23. The intimate/public distinction does not seem evident in John Witherspoon's 
(whose lectures James Madison attended) listing, as a basic human right, a "right to associ· 
ate, if he so inclines, with any person or person, whom he can persuade (not force)--under 
this is contained the right to marriage." David Richards, Toleration and the Constitution 233 
& notes (Oxford U. Press, 1986). 
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too narrow. Theoretical notions of liberty require, and some First 
Amendment based Court decisions involve, constitutional protec-
tion of voluntary associations in which people associate to act, to 
embody values and to accomplish aims. Such associations are pri-
vate centers of power, which is one of the reasons justifying protec-
tion.24 Still, as power centers, associations can pose threats to 
various societal objectives and values, including freedom, even as 
they claim protection on the basis of being a manifestation of free-
dom. This conflict presents one of the most troublesome problems 
in constitutional law. 
Without trying to resolve the complexities, several threads of a 
desirable approach can be noted. First, courts have properly 
granted assemblies and associations less protection against state in-
trusion in three overlapping contexts. Commercial or market-ori-
ented associations receive virtually no protection. Courts also 
sometimes permit intervention in relation to associations and as-
semblies that exist in significant degree to exercise coercive or in-
strumental power over nonmembers-rather than to further 
members' joint activities or aims in ways that do not involve domi-
nation of outsiders. And intervention can be appropriate when as-
sociation membership is a formal prerequisite to opportunities that 
in a democratic society should be available on a non-exclusive basis 
or when membership is otherwise non-voluntary. In thinking about 
these three contexts, note that in a market economy, commercial 
entities exercise instrumental power over people;2s and associations 
that are non-voluntary or are prerequisite to fundamental opportu-
nities have a non-consensual basis of leverage with which the associ-
ation can exercise power over members. The presence of these 
types of power can justify legal intrusion into otherwise voluntary 
associations. 
Second, in contexts where some intervention is justifiable, the 
type or purpose of state intervention often matters (although in re-
spect to profit-oriented commercial associations virtually any legis-
lative conception of the public good typically suffices to justify 
intervention). Most appropriate and most legitimate is a purpose of 
making associations more like local democratic governments26.-
24. See note I, supra. 
25. Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech at 210-18 (cited in note 1). 
26. These considerations suggest rejection of some precedents-for example, the Court 
should have permitted the union activity in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 
209 (1977), while upholding the state restriction on corporations in First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech at 223-
24 & notes (cited in note 1). But see Sheldon Leader, Freedom of Association (Yale U. Press, 
1992). 
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that is, interventions to require that membership criteria be non-
invidious and to guarantee democratic rights for members. Many 
statutory mandates in the labor context illustrate this type of 
intervention. 
Potential abuse of private power also complicates claims to en-
gage in the free exercise of religion. Even without Justice Scalia's 
attempt to wipe out most of the significance of the Free Exercise 
Clause as a protector of behavior dictated by conscience,27 free ex-
ercise claims often run afoul of concerns that the claimant asserts 
illegitimate degrees of private power. Many liberals who are quite 
sympathetic to free exercise attacks on laws that involve implicitly 
paternalistic judgments find more difficult free exercise claims that 
involve the religious group (or its members) exercising power over 
others. 
Surely one significant difference between a religiously-based de-
cision to ingest a drug or to refuse service in the military and a 
religiously-based assassination or kidnapping is that the latter acts 
involve the religious person applying instrumental force or violence 
to another person. Unsurprisingly, religious claims are also com-
paratively unpersuasive when they would create competitive advan-
tages in the economic marketplace. The low paid religious worker, 
the cost-avoiding neglect of safety in a religious day-care center, the 
business open on a day when the law requires competing businesses 
to be closed, all create competitive disadvantages for other, nonreli-
gious enterprises. Similarly problematic are free exercise claims 
that assert the right to control others' behavior. Even if a person 
could, for religious reasons, demand not to identify herself with a 
number, her claimed right to require others to organize their book-
keeping in ways that this religiously observant person values in-
volves her exercising power over others. The issue reoccurs in 
relation to land use. A religious group's religiously-based decision 
to use its land in a particular way usually poses a much lesser threat 
of private power than a claimed right to determine the use of land 
owned by others. Without trying to resolve these issues-on the 
facts of actual cases I think several of the judicially-denied religious 
claims should have prevailed-the point is that various doctrinal 
moves respond to a concern to limit private power operating under 
the label of religious freedom. 
IV. PARALLELS AND DIFFERENCES 
The earlier discussion of state action and these free exercise 
27. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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and freedom of association examples illustrate the ubiquitous influ-
ence of concerns about private power on constitutional interpreta-
tion. Still, these problems with private power differ in interesting 
ways from the problems private power poses in interpreting free-
dom of the press. These differences become clear when comparing 
the responsive interpretative moves. In the situations just dis-
cussed, the two most common interpretative responses are to ex-
pand the right, usually under the rubric of finding state action, or to 
narrow the right, either by careful sculpting (by the absolutist) or 
by accepting justified abridgments (by the balancer). 
For example, if a use of a constitutionally unprotected power 
of a private employer or property owner2s undermines a constitu-
tionally-based right29 or interest, the private power could be re-
stricted and the right vindicated by an appropriately expansive 
finding of state action (although more often the liberty, equality or 
dignitary interest will have to await legislative protection). Like-
wise, as illustrated in the discussions of freedom of association and 
free exercise of religion, to the extent that constitutional protection 
extends to private power, the constitutional right may threaten 
other important interests-efficient economic activity or public con-
trol over the environment or even other constitutionally-based in-
terests.3o Often the response is either to narrow the right or to 
countenance its abridgment. 
My earlier discussion of private power and the press poses a 
different issue. The very power that arguably undermines press 
freedom also claims protection as an aspect of that freedom. Or, to 
describe it differently, the private power of elements of the press 
may restrict the freedom of other elements, thereby undermining 
the functioning of the press in relation to the very performances 
28. I assume little plausibility to most constitutionally·based claims of a right to use 
commercial property to exercise power over others, for example those rejected by the Court 
in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980}-but the reach of constitutional 
protection of private power can be and is contested. 
29. In reasoning also reflected in his "ratchet theory" of section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, see, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), Justice Brennan once 
noted the Constitution may recognize a right but then not give it full protection-that is, the 
Constitution may only protect it against "state" action. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 
774-86 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Only such a non-
positivist reading of the Constitution permits talk of a private threat to First Amendment 
rights as opposed to a constitutional interest or value. See, e.g., Jason P. Isralowitz, The 
Reporter as Citizen: Newspaper Ethics and Constitutional Values, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 221 
(1992). 
30. For example, the purported association "rights" of the Junior Chamber of Com-
merce arguably restricted the equality "interests" of women. A possible press clause analogy 
is presented by publications that purportedly invade people's privacy, damage their reputa-
tions or cause them emotional distress. 
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that provide the rationale for constitutional protection. The prob-
lem is internal to the conception of press freedom. 
The difficulty can be resolved neither by expanded findings of 
state action, by balancing freedom of the press against other values, 
nor by steadfast maintenance of press freedom combined with using 
other means to handle its possible ill effects. Unlike the other exam-
ples examined, here recognizing claims made under the rubric of 
the right arguably undermines the right. Recognizing press free-
dom, if press freedom means advertisers' and private owners' free-
dom to pursue their communicative ends, may undermine press 
freedom if that freedom refers to freedom of the journalistic entity 
to pursue the communication endeavors that justify the constitu-
tional protection in the first place. The issue requires a choice of 
conceptions of press freedom. Under one view, greater realization 
of press freedom certainly permits and arguably calls for3I the gov-
ernment to intervene, not to restrict private power external to the 
press, like the power of the employer or shopping center who are 
restricted in order to further speech, but to influence the institu-
tional organization of the press itself. 
This internal conflict has analogies to recent debates about free 
speech. Some critiques of pornography and hate speech identify an 
evil resulting from these forms of speech beyond the offensive and 
injurious expression or the anti-social or criminal behavior that the 
speech sometimes encourages, whether or not intentionally. 
Rather, a central evil, according to this argument, is the capacity 
for socially dominant groups to use this speech to silence socially 
subordinate groups, to silence women or racial minorities.32 (Simi-
lar silencing claims are sometimes made concerning massive uses of 
wealth in the political process.) Although I find these arguments in 
crucial respects empirically unconvincing, if persuasive, they paral-
lel the argument in relation to private power and the press. They 
31. The difference between permitting and requiring government intervention has a 
clear history in the broadcast arena, where intervention has been permitted but not required. 
See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding fairness doc-
trine); CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) (upholding obligation of broadcasters to allow candi-
dates reasonable [paid] access); CBS v. Democratic Nat'/ Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) 
(broadcasters have no constitutional obligation to accept paid ads from responsible individu-
als or groups even though Congress might be able to impose such an obligation). 
32. In describing what pornography does, Catharine MacKinnon argues that it 
"normaliz[es] the terror that enforces silence on women's point of view." It "makes protest 
inaudible." Thus, "the free so-called speech of men silences the free speech of women." 
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward A Feminist Theory of the State 205 (Harv. U. Press, 1989). 
See also Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argu-
ment: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 Tenn. L. Rev. 291 (1989); Charle!. R. Law-
rence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L.J. 
431. 
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would illustrate how protection of private power under the rubric of 
a constitutional right can itself undermine the right or, at least, the 
functioning of the right in relation to aspects of the affirmative ra-
tionale that justifies protection. Certainly, if empirically convinced 
by these claims of silencing, the account of private power implicit in 
the speech might influence interpretative choices relating to the sub-
stantive right. 
Still, an important difference between the speech cases and the 
press cases could lead to different interpretative responses. The 
rights have different sorts of rationales. Speech, association and 
religion receive constitutional protection (at least in part) as embod-
iments of collective respect for individual liberty or autonomy. 
Within liberal constitutional theory, these rights have intrinsic and 
not merely instrumental value. Of course, the exercise of basic 
rights can cause problems, even serious harms. But any restriction 
placed on individual choice within the proper scope of the right is 
implicitly intolerant of personhood or agent autonomy and is neces-
sarily an abridgment of the right. This point strongly affirms the 
civil libertarian instinct that asserts that the appropriate collective 
response should take forms that do not involve suppressing liberty 
or abridging the right. 
In contrast, liberal constitutional theory values institutions, 
like the press, only instrumentally. The secular value of institutions 
and their freedom lies only in their service to human interests, 
broadly defined. Given that a right's scope is related to its justifica-
tion, the appropriate interpretation choices related to the Press 
Clause should relate to whether the interpretation promotes a free 
and independent press that can be expected to best serve its demo-
cratic functions. 
These two features of press freedom-that private power 
presents a problem internal to the conception of press freedom and 
that the Constitution values the press only instrumentally-should 
influence constitutional doctrine. When a constitutionally pro-
tected power center negatively affects other significant interests, 
usually the government (and private groups) can most effectively 
support those negatively affected interests in ways that do not limit 
the offending constitutional right. But that response makes little 
sense where the problem of private power is internal to the right, 
because the asserted evil is that the power is crippling the function-
ing of the right itself. And where the constitutionally protected pri-
vate power is itself intrinsically valued, modifying the right to take 
account of the abuse typically contradicts the very rationale of the 
right. An example is preventing a person from making bad choices 
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when her interest-or right-is precisely to make decisions, good or 
bad, for herself. But that objection does not apply when the right 
has primarily an instrumentalist justification.33 
Thus, although sources of private power-owners or advertis-
ers-themselves make arguable claims for Press Clause protection, 
that claim is weakened since their private power involves censorial 
control over expressive choices made by other portions of the pro-
tected institution, choices by other people within the protected insti-
tutional framework.34 It is further weakened given an empirical 
conclusion that this private power significantly undermines the in-
stitution's performance of the roles that justified constitutional pro-
tection in the first place. The interpretative response should take 
the form of instrumentally construing the right in a manner that 
walks a tightrope between protecting against the twin dangers of 
abuse by government and by private power. At this point, that in-
terpretative issue should be directly addressed. 
V. FOUR INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRESS CLAUSE 
Consider four possible doctrinal readings of the Press Clause. 
First, the guarantee might be read as prohibiting the government 
from any actions especially directed at the press-a "neutrality" or 
"wall of separation" requirement analogous to the wall of separa-
tion sometimes asserted to separate church and state.Js This read-
ing would be logical if press freedom were threatened only by 
government. Government interventions would always be dangerous 
to, and never required by, the idea of press freedom. Thus, press 
freedom reasonably could be identified with free enterprise within a 
relatively unregulated marketplace. Such a wall of separation read-
ing, however, strays far from two centuries of practice involving 
governmental intervention. 
33. In contrast to rights of free exercise, free speech and freedom of association, but like 
the Press Clause, the Establishment Clause is best seen through an instrumentalist rather 
than an autonomy-based lens. Still, despite important parallels, equally important differences 
between the particular instrumentalist and power concerns justifying these two institution-
ally-oriented constitutional provisions should shape their interpretation. 
34. Justice Hugo Black made the most perceptive judicial comment on this point. For 
the Court, he reasoned: "It would be strange indeed ... if the grave concern for freedom of 
the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command 
that the government was without power to protect that freedom .... Freedom of the press 
from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of 
that freedom by private interests." Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 20 (1945). 
35. Admittedly, in establishment clause jurisprudence there is a subtle difference be-
tween the wall of separation and the neutrality metaphors; this first interpretation of the Press 
Clause is more like "neutrality." Still, I will also use the former metaphor because, as an 
image, wall of separation is more suggestive of the government practice required by this inter-
pretation of the Press Clause. 
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Throughout our history, often with judicial approval, the gov-
ernment has acted in ways that subsidize the press, frequently with 
the intent of influencing the press to develop in particular ways. 
Obviously government policy significantly affects the structure and 
broadcast content of radio and television. But this has always also 
been true in respect to newspapers. Especially during the nine-
teenth century, postal subsidies often made newspapers possibl~ 
and the terms of the subsidies greatly affected the nature of newspa-
per enterprises. Patronage, government advertising and govern-
ment printing contracts were other major influences purposefully 
designed to promote a particular array of media enterprises. 
Government policy continues to be pervasive and to exercise 
considerable influence. Probably the most commonly noted exam-
ple is the Newspaper Preservation Act, special press-oriented legis-
lation that selectively advantages some papers and disadvantages 
others. A Rand Corporation study concludes that federal legisla-
tion, mostly tax laws, not efficiency or market considerations, is the 
major cause for the continuing trend toward chain ownership of 
newspapers.36 Variable postal subsidies continue and they continue 
to influence the makeup of the press. The White House gives press 
privileges that obviously amount to a subsidy for the press-a sub-
sidy that lessens the cost of reporting certain types of information 
and a subsidy differentially granted to some journalists from some 
media entities but not to others.37 Many state law examples can 
also be cited. For example, in 1991, under Governor Pete Wilson's 
leadership, California adopted a sales tax on newspapers' circula-
tion sales but not their advertising sales-legislation that is almost 
the exact converse of the legal regime in most European countries, 
where more enlightened thinking about press policy exists. The 
California tax scheme creates incentives for newspapers to increase 
their responsiveness to the wishes of advertisers and decrease their 
responsiveness to readers. 
These examples, some of which have received judicial sanction, 
just begin to describe the extent to which practice has rejected the 
wall of separation interpretation of the Press Clause. Given my the-
sis here, that private power as well as government power pose sig-
nificant threats to press freedom, rejection of this interpretation has 
been wise. 
36. James N. Dertouzos and Kenneth E. Thorpe, Newspaper Groups: Economies of 
Scale, Tax Laws, and Merger Incentives (Rand, R-2878-SBA, 1982). 
37. As described in Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1977), two of the re-
quirements for obtaining a White House press pass are residence in Washington ~nd a regul~r 
need to report from the White House. Obviously, many (particularly less estabhshed) med1a 
entities will not have journalists that meet these criteria. 
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Three other interpretations either allow or require more direct 
government intervention. A second, "effects" interpretation would 
permit government support but not allow laws directed at the press 
if they have a negative effect on any portion of the press. Under a 
third, "bad purposes" interpretation, even some burdening or re-
strictive effects (although not censorship) would be allowed unless 
the structural regulation was adopted for the purpose of limiting the 
vitality or freedom of the press. The fourth, most interventionist 
approach reads the guarantee of freedom to require the government 
to adopt laws that promote that freedom, that is, promote the effec-
tive functioning of some vision of a free press. 
I will put aside the fourth approach here. Something of the 
sort arguably appears in countries that do not have our state action 
qualification to their constitutional guarantee of a free press. And 
something like the fourth approach has seen some advocacy in this 
country, particularly in relation to the claim that the constitution 
imposes some public access requirements on at least some elements 
of the press. Nevertheless, this interpretation has received virtually 
no judicial recognition in this country. Moreover, it may be unwise 
to expect a constitutional court to be an appropriate body to make 
the instrumental judgments about how best to further press opera-
tions or the normative judgments about exactly what vision of press 
performance ought to be constitutionally favored. 
This leaves the second and third interpretations-both of 
which allow limited governmental interventions. The second, per-
mitting government intervention but only to support, benefit or sub-
sidize the press, might initially seem most attractive. But if the fear 
to be alleviated by the constitutional guarantee is improper govern-
ment influence, which motivated the wall of separation interpreta-
tion, the second, "effects" approach does not eliminate the danger. 
It does not prevent the government from using a carrot-various 
forms of benefits-to undermine proper press performance. And 
the carrot, whether in the form of monetary subsidies, selectively 
granted news scoops, interviews and access, or licenses and permis-
sive exemptions,Js can be, and historically constantly has been, used 
to influence media content.39 Thus, if the only concern were an 
38. When Knight-Ridder's Detroit Free Press was seeking approval from Attorney Gen-
eral Edwin Meese to enter into a Joint Operating Agreement (JOA) with The Detroit News, 
both the Free Press and Knight-Ridder's Miami Herald reportedly "cooled" their criticism of 
Meese, and Meese cartoons "were prohibited until after he ruled on the JOA." James D. 
Squires, Read All About It! 123 (Times Books, 1993). 
39. Mark Hertsgaard suggests that the Reagan administration was more successful us-
ing promises of carrots to manipulate the press than the Nixon administration had been using 
burdens or threats of burdens. Mark Hertsgaard, On Bended Knee: The Press and the Reagan 
Presidency 182 (Farrar Straus Giroux, 1989). More dramatically, the Mexican political es-
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overriding fear of government, the second interpretation is inade-
quate. In contrast, although many contexts will be too ambiguous 
to justify judicial limitation, the "bad purpose" approach properly 
helps police objectionable use of carrots. 
On the other hand, if a robust, democratic press requires re-
strictions on uses of private power that undermine press freedom, 
the second approach is too restrictive. The rationale for the move 
from the wall of separation approach to an interpretation that al-
lows government support or subsidy is the conclusion that certain 
governmental interventions help. But this reasoning supports even 
broader governmental interventions. It endorses the propriety of 
various regulations directed specifically at the media even if the reg-
ulations disadvantage some elements if they are justified as ad-
vantaging others. For example, the concern with private power and 
the view that government intervention can help suggest the propri-
ety of laws directed at the structure and distribution of media own-
ership, at the organization of control within media enterprises (that 
is, a media-oriented labor law) and at economic incentives within 
the media realm as long as the purpose of these laws is to promote, 
not undermine, media independence and performance. 40 
Of course, such affirmative legislative power can be abused. 
The third interpretation asserts that the Press Clause primarily pro-
hibits this government abuse. Given judicial review, a constitu-
tional court could police legislative perversions. In addition to 
outlawing any form of censorship, this interpretation treats as un-
constitutional governmental purposes to undermine the press's ca-
pacity to perform the functions that provide the rationale for 
constitutional protection. But other (non-censorial) laws, laws 
aimed at improving its functioning, especially laws aimed at ex-
panding or strengthening press freedom, are constitutional. 
This doctrinal discussion shows that the greater the concern 
with private power, the greater the appeal of the third, "bad pur-
pose" interpretation and the clearer the inadequacies of the first and 
second interpretations. If private power were both adequate and 
tablishment reportedly achieves extensive control over newspapers almost exclusively by 
means of cash "advertising" payments. Raymundo Riva Palacio, The Kept Mexican Press, 
Nieman Reports, Summer 1992, at 53. 
40. The answer to the question "Who is the press that receives constitutional protec-
tion?" could reasonably be the people whose professional activities constitute the press-
although possibly more commonly within legal thinking in this country, the press is identified 
with the owners. The choice between these two answers is not a matter of logic and, I have 
argued, should be answered contextually on the basis of public discussion. See Baker, 
Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech at 250-71 (cited in note 1). Although the effects 
analysis arguably rules out legislation based on this public discussion, it is clearly contem-
plated, although bounded, by the bad purpose interpretation. 
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not abusive in the context of media production, the wall of separa-
tion analysis would have obvious appeal. If private power is not 
adequate, that is, if the problem is that the market provides the 
press with inadequate resources, then government support under 
the second, "effects" analysis might seem appropriate. But if pri-
vate power is also seen as a threat to democratically needed press 
performance, the third, "bad purpose" (or possibly the fourth) in-
terpretation is most appealing. 
Moreover, 1 suggest that this "bad purpose" interpretation 
provides the best understanding of both much historically enacted 
and accepted law relating to the media and of a range of judicial 
decisions approving such laws. Only this approach would permit 
adoption of the Newspaper Preservation Act, limitations imposed 
uniquely on (some) newspapers restricting their ability to increase 
their "speech" by owning broadcast facilities, various regulations of 
utilities such as a requirement that telephone companies operate as 
common carriers or that Baby Bells not own and originate cable 
programming. Although this structural area of press law remains 
in flux, existing constitutional doctrine appears most comprehensi-
ble as illustrating a wise response to the problems posed by private 
power in undermining press freedom. 
